This paper investigates changes in the conduct of U.S. monetary policy. Monetary policy is modeled in the context of the Bernanke-Mihov (1998) structural VAR (SVAR) extended to allow explicitly for the Fed's forward looking behavior. This is achieved by including its realtime forecasts on in ‡ation and unemployment (the "Greenbook" forecasts). Stability tests that exploit the SVAR identifying restrictions indicate signi…cant time variation in the policy response to the state of the economy. Moreover, the estimation of a ‡exible time varying parameter model on the implied policy reaction function suggests an important shift toward a greater response to in ‡ation relative to unemployment. A counterfactual simulation exercize shows that the identi…ed changes in systematic monetary policy have a signi…cant e¤ect on real activity, but do not appear to be at the origin of business cycle ‡uctuations.
its changes investigated through sub-sample estimations, or by including variables that capture political in ‡uences. However, the scope of the single equation framework is limited. It is di¢cult, to account for potential changes in the Fed's operating procedure -such as during the "non-borrowed reserves experiment" -and questions related to the e¤ect of monetary policy cannot be addressed.
Another approach makes use of the vector autoregression (VAR) framework to identify more general policy reaction functions that can potentially accommodate for these limitations. A leading example in that respect is Bernanke and Mihov (1998) (BM) , where the structure of a simple model of the market for reserves, consistent with di¤erent operating procedure, is incorporated. However, the existing VAR analyses do not attempt to associate the observed instability of these reduced-form model in terms of changes in the Fed's response to the economy.
The present investigation seeks progress mainly on four grounds. First it attempts to isolate and interpret changes originating from the Fed's response to the economy, while explicitly recognizing the possibility of various other sources of instability in the economy. Second, it tries to provide a more realistic account of the information available to the Fed at the time decisions were made.
Third, because the anecdotal evidence suggests that the conduct of monetary policy might have changed in various and complex ways, instability is not modeled as discrete jumps but in a more ‡exible and parsimonious way. This allows to capture important changes that might otherwise be missed. Finally, by preforming the analysis within an empirical model describing the economic environment, the importance of the identi…ed changes in the conduct of monetary policy can be quanti…ed in terms of their e¤ects on key macroeconomic variables.
To investigate these questions, an empirical model of the macroeconomic environment is required. If a consensus dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model was available, the best way to tackle these issues would be to impose the full structure of the model on the data. Absent this consensus and given the apparent lack of …t of this type of models with the time series facts, I use VAR techniques. As the time variation found in a reduced form VAR, akin to its parameters, does not have immediate structural interpretation, two key ingredients are added to isolate the source of instability. First, enough structure is imposed to obtain a general form of policy reaction function.
In particular, the BM structural VAR (SVAR) is used in order to disentangle potential changes in the Fed's operating procedure from changes in its response to the economy. This is particularly Gertler (2000) . Barth and al. (1982) allows the response of the Fed to vary with the severity of economic conditions.
For the linear class of policy rules, this could be another source of instability.
important since anecdotal evidence suggests that the most important change in the response to the economy might have occurred concurrently with changes in the operating procedure, between 1979-82.
Second, if the Fed is forward looking, the policy response cannot be properly identi…ed unless expectations are taken into account. For this reasons, the Fed's real-time forecasts on in ‡ation and unemployment, contained in the Green Book, are introduced in the VAR. This procedure turns out to be a very convenient way of modeling the forward looking behavior without introducing non-linearities in the estimation, that would tremendously complicate accounting for instability at the later stage. The inclusion of the Green Book forecasts also provide a more realistic account of the information available to the Fed. In fact, since they are constructed in real-time, these forecasts are not based on knowledge of the revised data, which is usually assumed in standard VAR analysis.
Moreover, the information attributed to the Fed is not limited to the variables included in the VAR.
Rather, as the evidence from Romer and Romer (2000) suggests, the Fed's forecasting model can potentially use a wide range of variables, as well as Fed's private information.
The changes in the Fed's response to the economy and its operating procedure are modeled using a time varying parameter (TVP) model. The appeal of this modeling strategy comes from the fact that it can approximate multiple discrete changes as well as other types of instability or non-linearities in a fairly parsimonious way. This is particularly desirable in the present context where the true nature of the change is unknown. However, the standard estimation approach is frustrated in a VAR context by the large number of estimated parameters. The main methodological contribution of the paper is to show a way in which the TVP estimation can be implemented in a SVAR. The estimation strategy is based on the Stock and Watson (1998) median-unbiased estimation of the variance of the parameters.
The results suggest important changes in the response of monetary policy to the economic environment. As might be expected, it is under Volcker that the most important changes were e¤ected. During that period, the Fed's attention radically shifted from unemployment to in ‡ation.
The counterfactual simulations show that while these identi…ed changes appear large in terms of their e¤ects on the economy, they do not seem to be at the origin of the business cycle ‡uctuations.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the identi…cation of the forward looking policy rule. Section 3 answers the question "Has the Fed's conduct of monetary policy changed?" from a statistical perspective by determining the extent of instability in the policy reaction function. Section 4 models the observed instability by estimating a TVP model on the policy reaction function and Section 5 discusses the e¤ect of the identi…ed changes on the hypothetical path of the variables of the VAR. Section 6 concludes.
Identi…cation of the policy reaction function
In the monetary SVAR literature, the identi…cation of monetary policy shocks is obtained by imposing enough restrictions on the contemporaneous correlations among the variables of the reduced form VAR. Unfortunately, as emphasized below, the policy reaction function itself does not necessarily obtain from the identi…ed monetary policy shock. Moreover, if the Fed is forward looking, the parameters of the policy reaction function can potentially be functions of all the parameters relevant to the formation of its expectations. These complications must then be addressed.
Forward looking behavior: the Green Book forecasts
The existence of long lags in the e¤ect of monetary policy can induce the Fed to respond to the forecasted values of its goals, rather than the actual or past values. The theoretical appeal of such a behavior has been investigated by Haldane and Batini (1999) and evidence of its empirical relevance is supported by Clarida et al. (2000) , who show that forward looking rules provide a better account of the recent monetary history.
If the lags of a set of variables are a su¢cient statistic for the Fed's expectations, these would be embodied in a VAR using these variables. However, even in this case, the policy weights must be isolated from the expectations parameters in order to determine the source of instability. This cannot be obtained directly from the VAR.
How should the forward looking behavior be taken into account? One approach is to explicitly model and estimate the expectation process. For instance, Clarida, et al. (2000) assume that the Fed has rational expectations, an assumption they then exploit to derive moment conditions that can be used in a GMM framework 5 . Unfortunately, this approach is not immediately suited for the estimation of time-varying parameters models as it requires adding a signi…cant amount of structure and extending the estimation of TVP models to the IV framework. The alternative considered in this paper is to use real-time forecasts as a proxy for the Fed's expectations. In particular, I use the forecasts computed by the sta¤ of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors before each FOMC meeting and published in what is known as the "Green Book". They have been used originally in a single equation framework by McNees (1986 McNees ( , 1992 and recently Romer and Romer (2000) used them to investigate the extent of private information held by the Fed.
Using the Green Book forecasts has many advantages. In the multivariate context, it isolates the forward looking behavior of the Fed, without having to modify any of the VAR techniques; the Green Book forecasts are simply added to the VAR. Also, as mentioned in the introduction, it presumably makes a better account of the information available to the Fed. Thus, if these information gaps are important and even if no attempt were made to identify the policy weights, the inclusion of the Green Book forecasts in the VAR could provide a better account of the Fed's information.
It is for the identi…cation of the source of instability, however, that these forecasts will be most useful. A key assumption in this respect is that they are not contaminated by the presence of changes in the structure of the economy. This seems reasonable since if the forecasters observed any such changes, there is no reason why they would not have modi…ed their forecasting models accordingly. On the other hand, even if the changes went unnoticed, a change in the policymakers' response to the forecasts would require them to have more information about the structure of the economy than the forecasters within the Fed. Under this assumption then, the e¤ect of changes in the conduct of monetary policy on the forecasts can be ignored.
It is important to recognize, however, that the Green Book data are in fact conditional forecasts; that is, they are computed under an assumption about the current and future course of monetary policy. This can in principle bias any estimation using these forecasts. Unfortunately, since the underlying policy assumption is never made public, there is no obvious bias correction procedure that can be implemented. 6 There are good reasons, however, to believe that this is not an important issue for our empirical investigation. First, we don't expect the bias introduced, if any, to be signi…cant at the short horizons used in this paper. In fact, given the known lags in the e¤ect of monetary policytypically estimated to be more than three quarters -the policy assumption should not signi…cantly 6 There does not exist any documentation of these forecasts. This description is based on discussions with people at the Fed. Note that the forecasts are constructed before the FOMC meetings and serve as input to the decision. in ‡uence the forecasts at short horizons. Moreover, the in ‡uence of the policy scenario on the forecasts should grow as the horizon increases. Yet, the qualitative results did not appear to be signi…cantly a¤ected by the choice of horizon. 7 Further, Romer and Romer (2000) …nd that the relative performance of the Green Book forecasts with respect to the private sector is poorer for long than for short horizon, which is inconsistent with the idea of the policy assumption playing an important role. Second, even if the underlying policy assumption did bias the estimate, this is not likely to have a signi…cant in ‡uence on the main results of this paper. In fact, as long as these policy assumptions have been made in more or less consistent fashion throughout the sample -which is not unreasonable -this would not contaminate the interpretation of the identi…ed structural changes in the conduct of policy reported below.
The earliest such forecasts available is for the October 1965 meeting and the latest is for the December 1992 meeting and the forecast horizons available vary from the current quarter up to four quarters ahead 8 . However, forecast horizon inconsistencies and missing observations make the earliest starting date to be September 1971 and it varies across forecast horizons 9 . Also, the inconsistency arising from the change in the measure of output forecasted -from GNP to GDP -required the elimination of observations after 1991:10. Anecdotal evidence and existing results suggest that the Fed is using forecasting horizons in the higher end of those available or even greater for in ‡ation. Since the sample of the 4-Q horizon is much shorter, the paper focuses on the results from the 3-Q horizon. This is justi…ed from the fact that when this speci…cation of the model is estimated on the same sample as the 4-Q speci…cation, very similar results are obtained.
Two variables of this data set are used in the VAR described below. First the Fed's expected in ‡ation is proxied by the forecasted percentage change in the GNP de ‡ator. Second, because of changes in the base year, no consistent measure of forecasted real GDP exists over the sample considered and hence, the unemployment gap is used as the measure of economic activity. This 7 Results for alternative forecasting horizons are available from the author. 8 The forecasts are publicly available with a …ve-year lag. Note that the current values of these variables are not known within the period. Besides, the Greenbook forecasts are not available at a standard frequency: usually eight data points a year are available, and they are not evenly spaced. In this paper they have been linearly interpolated to obtain monthly series. Assuming instead that, for months in between meetings, only the last meeting forecasts are known, did not a¤ect the qualitative nature of the results. 9 The starting dates for the di¤erent horizons are as follows. 
A monetary SVAR
The SVAR approach puts restrictions on the covariance matrix of the VAR residuals in order to identify the fundamental shocks. In the context of monetary policy analysis, this allows us to identify the monetary policy shocks. A typical set of identifying restrictions, implicit in the Taylor rule for instance, assumes that the policy instrument is the Fed funds rate and that the policy reaction function is ordered last in the VAR. However, when the conduct of monetary policy is modeled from the Fed's behavior on the market for reserves, it appears that such a rule is a reduced form and that its parameters are function of other equations' parameters, such as those of the banks demand for reserves. As a result, the model of the market for reserves implicit in the BM identi…cation scheme allows a better identi…cation of the policy responses. Moreover potential changes in the operating procedure can be isolated, the model being consistent with di¤erent such 1 0 Note that this is the negative of the unemployment gap. That way, an increase in this measure corresponds to an increase in output over its potential. 1 demographic-based measure and (3) a naive measure that uses the unemployment average between the previous NBER business cycle's peaks. The same qualitative results obtain, and the a priori choice of the Gordon's NAIRU gives estimates that are in the middle range of the others. These results are available from the author.
procedures 13 .
The variables entering this VAR can be divided in two sets. First, the non-policy block includes the variables summarizing the economy and its expected behavior. The non-policy variable vector Y t includes the log of GDP, the log of GDP de ‡ator (GDPD), the log of a commodity price index (PCOM), and as described in the previous section, the forecasted in ‡ation (¼ e ) and unemployment gap (ug e ) at a given horizon. The policy variable vector P t includes the variables relevant to monetary policy and its operating procedure: a total (TR) and a non-borrowed (NBR) reserves measures, as well as the federal fund's rate (FF). Data are monthly 14 . Given the time span of the data, 1973:6 to 1991:10, I consider the results obtained from a parsimonious speci…cation of the lag structure of the VAR, which uses lags 1, 2, 4, 6, and 12 15 .
A key identifying assumption of the BM SVAR is that the non-policy variables do not respond to policy variables within the period. This is a reasonable assumption if lags in the e¤ect of monetary policy actually exist. The validity of this identifying restriction is not as clear for the Green Book forecasts. However, the discussion above suggests that, at short-horizons, these forecasts are not likely to be signi…cantly in ‡uenced by short-term change in the policy instrument. Under this assumption then, the non-policy variables are predetermined with respect to the policy variables and can enter contemporaneously in the policy block of the model. Hence, this block can be analyzed separately and the following equations are obtained:
where
§ is a diagonal matrix, the diagonal of A 0 contains only 0, and p is the number of lags included. Under this assumption, the dynamics of the economy can be left unrestricted and the policy block can be analyzed independently. Also, the instability of the two blocks can be disentangled.
To identify the policy reaction function, contemporaneous restrictions are imposed on A 0 and C: These originate from a simple model of the market for reserves through which the Fed enacts 1 3 While a fed funds rate targeting procedure describes reasonably well the Fed's operating procedure over most of the sample, BM show that the 1979-1982 period is better characterized as a non-borrowed reserves targeting procedure. 1 4 Apart from the Greenbook forecasts, data are the same as in BM. In particular, monthly GDP and GDPD are interpolated using a method similar to those proposed by Chow and Lin (1971) . See BM for details. 1 5 The lag structure was chosen based on AIC, requiring no more than 6 lags to be introduced.
monetary policy. Without going in the details, the static market for reserves -ignoring the responses to the non-policy block -can be described by banks' demand for total reserves, banks' demand for borrowed reserves and the Fed's supply of non-borrowed reserves 16 :
These can be translated in terms of restrictions on (1), and the policy block (1) can thus be written out explicitly as:
where a ij and b ij are respectively the j th line of matrices A i and B i . In the TVP estimation that follows, we need the system to have a recursive structure. Following BM, this is obtained by setting
The second equation of system (2) represents the BM speci…cation of the Fed's policy response function, extended to include the Green Book forecasts. It assumes that the Fed is using the nonborrowed reserves as its fundamental instrument. This is a general form of policy response function:
operating procedures where the Fed is targeting the Fund's rate or the borrowed reserves, as well as hybrid cases, correspond to particular values of the parameters in A 0 and C.
Since most of the estimated policy rules in the literature assumed that the Fed uses FF as its instrument, it is useful to discuss what the BM model implies for such an estimation. Solving out the FF equation for the contemporaneous policy variables yields:
Most of the policy rules that have been estimated, such as Taylor (1993) type rules, can be viewed as constrained versions of (3) . If the goal is to identify the monetary policy shock ² s t , estimation of (3) will be justi…ed as long as Á d = 1 and Á b = ¡1, as emphasized by BM. However, this equation illustrates that the identi…cation of the monetary policy shocks does not imply that the policy reaction function is identi…ed. Even for these values of the operating procedure parameters, such an equation is as a reduced form that incorporates parameters of the demands for total and borrowed reserves. In order to recover the "true" policy response, the complete market for reserves must be considered. Based on this observation, the interpretation of the Taylor rule coe¢cients as "policy responses" might be precarious.
This argument is especially important for the analysis of instability. As an example, consider the case of an hypothetical "vanishing liquidity e¤ect" 18 . This would occur in the present model if
In such a case, time variation in the coe¢cients of Y t in (3) should be detected, albeit no change in the Fed's response to the economy. Based on these observations, it is clear that the use of a multivariate framework as well as an explicit model of the market for reserves will allow a tighter interpretation of the estimated parameters and of their instability.
The general form of the policy reaction function still hinders the interpretation of its coe¢cients.
One justi…cation for having a completely unrestricted lag structure is that they implicitly incorporate the expectations. However, in the context of the model speci…ed here, since the expectations are explicitly incorporated in the VAR, it is presumably justi…ed to impose a more restrictive lag structure. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, Clarida et al. (2000) argue that assuming that the Fed responds only to forecasted in ‡ation and unemployment gaps characterizes its behavior reasonably well. Therefore, in what follows I will mainly discuss the results from the following constrained version of the policy reaction function:
where h is the horizon of the forecasts and the in ‡ation target is subsumed in the constant. This is still a general speci…cation of the policy reaction function. In fact, while the structure imposed on the response to the economy is in the same spirit as a Taylor type rules, it leaves other potential concerns of the Fed unrestricted. In particular, interest rate smoothing concerns, or various form of operating procedures are allowed.
It is important to notice at this point that, although this single equation represents the Fed's conduct of monetary policy, it cannot be analyzed in isolation. In fact, the di¤erent operating procedures are represented in this framework by the Fed's response to ² d t and ² b t , which are obtained from the other equations of the VAR.
3 Testing for changes in the policy reaction function.
Lets now address the …rst question of this paper: has the conduct of monetary policy changed?
In the framework laid out in the previous section, this asks if the parameters of equation (4) have varied through time.
One piece of useful evidence for that purpose comes from stability tests performed on reduced form VARs. In fact, any instability in the structural model will lead to instability in the reduced form. Moreover, the reduced form being free of any restrictions, it can capture instability emanating from any parts of the model; as such, it provides a general picture of the amount of instability present in the model. Finally, given the assumed recursiveness between the policy and non-policy blocks, instability found in the non-policy variables of the reduced form VAR can be interpreted as the instability arising from the economic environment.
Con ‡icting results on the importance of instability have been reached in the literature. For instance, BM concluded to the stability of their VAR, whereas Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) found strong evidence using a similar VAR. Boivin (1999) provides an explanation for these discrepancies. He argues that these results depend crucially on the speci…c test used and the number of parameters being estimated and tested and concludes that, once the properties of the testing strategies are taken into account, instability appears to be widespread among reduced form macroeconomic relationships 19 .
While instability in reduced form VAR is consistent with changes in the policy reaction function, it is not possible to infer the source of instability. To gather evidence on the stability of the policy reaction function, we need to exploit the restrictions provided by the SVAR. The model considered in this paper …ts the following general class of structural VARs, where allowance is made for a general form of instability and heteroskedasticity:
where,
, the diagonal of A 0;t contains only 1, k is the number of variables in the VAR, and p is the number of lags included. The associated reduced form is:
with:
The reduced form is essentially a transformation of the structural model given by A ¡1 0;t . Testing for the stability of the structural VAR consists of disentangling the instability of that matrix from the other parameters of the model. In fact, if for simplicity, only A 0;t is time-varying, it becomes clear from (6) that instability could be found anywhere in the reduced form and that the VAR residuals would be heteroskedastic. This is the sense in which the reduced form evidence previously found is di¢cult to interpret. If this instability is in the form of structural breaks, modeling it in the reduced form would require including a dummy variable for each and every parameters of the reduced form model, which amounts to perform sub-sample estimation. This appears to be quite ine¢cient if the only source of change comes from A 0;t . Hence, in addition to locating the instability, an explicit account of the structural model restrictions could lead to more parsimonious modeling of instability.
Clearly, the stability of A 0;t cannot be assessed using the standard 2-step estimation technique of the structural parameters. In fact, the structural parameters are obtained from the variancecovariance matrix of the …rst stage residuals. Yet, from above, instability in A 0;t implies that the …rst stage VAR is unstable and hence, a constant parameter estimation of the VAR will lead to miss-speci…ed residuals. Also, the constraints imposed on the policy reaction function eliminates the e¢ciency of the two-step estimation since the reduced form equation do not have the same regressors. Consequently, the estimation must be performed directly on the structural form.
An alternative is to recognize that the SVAR is really a simultaneous equation model with covariance restrictions. Hausman and Taylor (1983) have shown that the FIML estimation of such a model is equivalent to an IV estimation where the covariance restrictions imply that the estimated residuals of some equations can be used as instruments in others 20 . Although identical to the twostep estimation under time invariant parameters, this approach suggests a sequential scheme to gather evidence on the stability of the di¤erent equations 21 .
Estimation of system (2) under the null of stability and taking the covariance restrictions into account, can be performed as follows. First, the T R t equation contains only predetermined variables so that it can be estimated by OLS. Using the residuals of this equation as an instrument for T R t ¡NBR t , the F F t equation can be estimated by IV. Finally, the NBR t equation is estimated by OLS, using the estimated residuals of the two previous equations, in lieu of the true disturbances.
Letting f(x t ; µ) represent the implied moment conditions, where the k £ 1 vector µ contains all the parameters of the model (with µ 0 their true values), this estimator of µ can be expressed in its GMM form as
t=1 f(x t ; µ) and W T is a weighting matrix.
Description of the stability tests:
In this GMM framework, Sowell (1996) proposes a general approach for constructing asymptotically optimal tests, for a general class of deterministic instability alternatives against the null of stability. This class of tests will be used to assess the stability of the SVAR, together with the Quandt (1960) likelihood ratio (QLR) test and an heteroskedastic version of the split sample Chow test (C-H), whenever OLS is feasible.
In general, when no information about the break date or its size is available, these tests maximize a weighted average of the power. The choice of the weighting scheme distinguishes the di¤erent elements of this class of tests, and allows the researcher to orient the power to certain parts of the sample relative to others. For tests of one time structural break in a subset of parameters of the SVAR, the tests used are of the form:
and R is a k £ l matrix, that selections the subset of l parameters allowed to be time-varying under the alternative. The T S a;1 test is optimal for alternatives far from the null and the T S a;0 test is optimal for alternatives that are close to the null. It is through the choice of a that it is possible to direct the power to certain parts of the sample. For instance, when a < 0, more weight is given to potential breaks happening in the middle of the sample. It is interesting to note that the Nyblom test is equivalent to the T S 0;0 test, and the T S 1=2;0 test is equivalent to one of the tests in Andrews-Ploberger (1994) . The tests used in this paper are T S ¡1=2;0 and T S ¡1=2;1 , since a priori, one could expect the policy reaction function to be more unstable around the middle of the sample -corresponding to the Volcker tenure -than elsewhere.
For conciseness and the fact that there are no clear alternative, the same tests are used for all three equations, although the weighting scheme might not be appropriate for all equations.
Testing strategy:
When testing for a subset of parameters, a necessary maintained hypothesis is that the non-tested parameters are constant. That is, in general, the test will not be robust to instability in the other parameters. However, in a system that has some recursive structure, it is possible to focus the test to get robustness. To see why, consider the special case of a just-identi…ed GMM estimation with two parameters to be estimated:
It is easy to see that our empirical model has this general structure. Considering only a test of stability on µ 1 , the optimal test considered above requires µ 2 to be constant under both the null and the alternative, and in such a case, to maximize the power, the test should make use of both moments. The recursive structure of the model however, makes it possible to obtain the estimate of µ 1 by looking only at the …rst moment. Hence, it is possible to test for the stability of this parameter, using only the …rst moment, without having to assume that µ 2 is stable. If the goal is the locate instability among the parameters of the model, the evidence, if any, of such a robust test would be more informative.
For our structural VAR, the testing strategy is as follows. The T R t equation is …rst tested and the results will be robust to instability in the other two equations. If no instability is found, or if it is otherwise modeled, the stability of the F F t equation can then be addressed. Finally, using the residuals of these two equations, test of stability on the policy reaction function can be performed, conditional on the treatment of instability up to this point.
Results:
From tables 1 and 2 the TR equation shows no evidence of instability whereas some evidence is found for the borrowed reserves demand equation. It is interesting to notice, that¯, which determines the presence of a liquidity e¤ect, is found to be stable. The implications of this instability on the results of the policy reaction function have been investigated by allowing for a break in the relevant parameters at a date determined endogenously. Since the results were not signi…cantly a¤ected, this evidence is ignored in the following results.
Based on the estimated residuals of the previous two equations, the policy reaction function can be estimated by OLS. This implies that the QLR and C-H tests can be applied directly. Table   3 presents their p-values, together with those of the Sowell's tests. There are important di¤erences in the results obtained from these tests. At the 5% level, the QLR test detects instability for all parameters but Á d , while the T S ¡1=2;1 test detects instability only for Á u . Many reasons might explain these divergent results. First, the large number of rejections for the QLR test could be due, in part, to the presence of some heteroskedasticity in the monetary policy shocks, as suggested by the ARCH(3) test. In fact, the instability found by the C-H tests, while important, is more moderate. Second, the larger number of rejections obtained with the T S ¡1=2;0 , with respect to the T S ¡1=2;1 test, might suggest instability that is close to the null. Finally, the small sample properties of the tests might explain part of these di¤erences 22 .
Based on these results, answering the …rst question of this paper, the Fed's response to the economy has changed over the period considered. In particular, a joint tests of the parameters summarizing the Fed's response to the economy and its operating procedure (Á 
Modeling instability:
How did the conduct of monetary policy change and by how much? Answering these questions requires modeling the instability of the parameters. The reasons for changes in the conduct of monetary policy proposed in the introduction could have a¤ected the parameters in di¤erent ways:
the Volcker "experiment" might be thought of as a break in the policy reaction function, whereas an evolutionary learning of the Fed might be of a more gradual nature. Unfortunately, the tests of the previous section do not provide useful guidance on the form of instability: they all have power against various alternatives and more than one type of change might be present in the policy reaction function.
The most common approach for modeling permanent changes in the parameters is the discrete break model, which is obtained by simply estimating the model over di¤erent sub-samples. Alternatively, the TVP model assumes that the parameters follow random walks. These two models are special cases of a more general martingale process of the form:
where E[! t ] = 0: In fact, the two models di¤er only by their implied distribution for ! t 23 .
From an empirical standpoint, when the true form of instability is unknown, which approach should be chosen? In the present context, the ‡exibility of the TVP model makes it a more 2 2 In fact, Boivin (1999) …nds that LM type tests, like the Sowell's tests used here, su¤er from size distortions in small sample. 2 3 The TVP model is directly obtained when ! t =´t: As shown in Nyblom (1989) , the one-time change model is obtained by letting !t =°t±t, where (°1; :::;°T ) is a multinomial with Pr(°t = 1) = p k and Pr(°t = 0) = 1 ¡ p k and ±t is iid with mean 0 and°d = 1:
appealing and potentially more fruitful modeling strategy. The reason is that it can capture more general type of changes and yet, still provide an approximation to the discrete break model.
First, if the true time variation in the parameters is not characterized by discrete jumps, imposing this structure would leave important features of the time-variation hidden. The converse is not true however. The TVP estimator of µ t is e¤ectively obtained by down-weighting the importance of the observations away from t. Obviously, if the true underlying process is a discrete change, the TVP model will be miss-speci…ed from the imposed normality on ! t . Yet, the TVP model, attempting to match the data, will imply small ! t for t far from the break date, and larger values for t closer to d, thus uncovering the general movement in the parameters. As such, the model provides an approximation to the discrete break model.
Another problem with the discrete change model is that it implies the estimation of many parameters, an estimate on each side of the breaks for each parameter. Moreover, it requires an estimate of the break dates. Consequently, although such an estimation approach is feasible in principle, it tends to produce unsatisfactory results when the number of breaks is large relative to the sample size (like more than 2 for the sample studied here) or the break dates are too close.
The TVP speci…cation on the other hand can capture the general features of multiple breaks, without estimating the break dates, and while keeping the number of estimated parameters …xed, independently of the true number of breaks. The TVP model is thus a parimonious way of capturing instability of a general form.
This ability of the TVP model to uncover multiple discrete changes is illustrated in Figure 2 .
The true underlying data generating process is simply a constant plus an i.i.d. disturbance, with the constant experiencing two breaks 24 . The …gure shows the true value of the constant over time, as well as 100 estimates of the TVP model applied to repetitive draws from this data generating process.
Given the uncertainty about the type of changes that monetary policy has undertaken, the TVP model is thus a ‡exible, parsimonious and tractable way of modeling instability.
Median-unbiased estimation:
The standard estimation procedure for TVP model is by maximum likelihood (MLE), making use of the Kalman …lter to construct the likelihood function from its forecast error decomposition representation. In a VAR however, the large number of parameters that need to be estimated simultaneously, even if only a few are allowed to be time varying, makes the estimation very fragile, especially for the estimation of the variance of the parameters 25 . Moreover, if the variance of the parameters is small, even when the model considered is tightly parameterized, the MLE tends to estimate the variance to be 0 26 . These are reasons why there have been few examples of TVP estimation in the VAR framework, and in those existing, the MLE estimation was avoided: Sims In this paper I present an alternative way of estimating TVP models in a VAR using a strategy proposed by Stock and Watson (1998) . Their estimation strategy is explicitly designed to account for the de…ciency of the MLE when the parameters' variance is small. It turns out, however, that when implemented in a VAR framework, it is possible to avoid the complications associated with the large number of parameters estimated by exploiting the "small" variance of the parameters.
The general idea of the estimation method is to exploit the fact that the distribution of stability tests, under the alternative of a TVP model, depends on the variance of the parameters. Hence, if all other parameters are known or are consistently estimable and this variance is a scalar -or is scaled by a single parameter -the 50 th quantile of the distribution can be inverted to obtain a median-unbiased estimator of that scalar and its con…dence interval can be derived from other quantiles.
More speci…cally, consider the following general model: 2 5 In fact, my attempts to estimate the model by MLE were undermined by the di¢culty associated with the estimation of the variance-covariance matrix of the parameters. 2 6 That is, the MLE has a (large) point mass at 0. See Stock and Watson (1998) for a discussion of this point in a single equation framework.
where " t and À t are serially and mutually uncorrelated mean 0 random disturbances. Under the null of constant parameters, the model is estimated by OLS. The scalar ¿ governs the size of the variance of the parameters, and to facilitate approximations based on asymptotic distributions, the case where it is small can be considered formally by making it local to 0:
In order to understand this parameterization, one needs to make the distinction between the small sample quantity ¿ , which we wish to estimate, and the asymptotic device that is used to estimate it. In fact, while asymptotically this parameterization implies that the variances of the parameters vanish, for any given sample T , ¿ is a …xed non-zero quantity. On the other hand, since the estimation is based on the asymptotic distribution of a test statistic, this parameterization gives a meaning to ¿ being "small" asymptotically. More speci…cally, as it is the case when computing the local power of a test, the variance of the parameters is assumed to shrink at the same rate as the sample size, which makes the asymptotic distributions of the tests dependent on¸.
A straightforward calculation shows that under this parameterization it is valid asymptotically to partial out the constant parameters part of (7),¯z t . Consequently, the uncertainty in¯can be ignored in the estimation of¸. From Theorem 1 of Stock and Watson (1998), the asymptotic distributions of the QLR T tests under this alternative are functionals of Brownian motion:
and W i are Brownian motions. As already mentioned, in order to be able to obtain an estimate of¸, the other parameters present in D must be known or consistently estimable. Stock and Watson (1998) 
where all and only the Á i 's are allowed to be time-varying. This equation is estimated as just described. are scaled in terms of the "long-run" multipliers of the funds rate, so that, for instance, a permanent one-percent increase in the unemployment gap will lead 2 7 The estimator is then obtained by substituting in this expression consistent estimates of §xx and -. The …rst is consistently estimated with T eventually to an increase in the fed funds rate equivalent to the re-scaled value of Á u t 28 . Moreover, in order to compare the results to those using the output gap as the real-activity measure, the long-run response to unemployment is in turn scaled using an Okun's law ratio of 2.5%. Finally, in order to determine where the instability would be found if a break date was estimated and to emphasize the information provided by the TVP estimation, the …gure also presents the 90% con…dence interval on the estimated break date of a discrete break model 29 .
Results and discussion:
To gain perspective on the results, it is useful to look at the range of existing estimates. First, Taylor (1993)'s suggestion for both weights on in ‡ation gap and output gap was 0.5. Clarida et al. A …rst glance at these graphs indicates economically important variation in these parameters. It is interesting to note, however, that the results do not strongly suggest the existence of a fed funds rate targeting procedure; such a procedure would require Á b t to be equal to -1. This result is 2 8 To make the results comparable with those obtained in the single equation framework, only the dynamics of NBR and FF are taken into account in the computation of the long-run response. 2 9 See Bai and Perron (1998) for information on the calculation of these con…dence intervals. 3 0 These con…dence intervals are computed conditional on the estimate of¸.
investigated further in the next section.
The response to in ‡ation deserves further discussion. The evolution of Á ¼ t is overall consistent with the conclusion reached by Clarida et al. (2000) who …nd that post-1979, the response to in ‡ation was much higher than before. However, contrary to their results, the point estimate of the time varying weight is never negative and, more importantly, its sustained increase starts only after 1982. Moreover, Á 0 t and Á u t are also important in distinguishing monetary policy before and after Volcker.
As one might expect, the main observation that stands out from the behavior of Á 
E¤ect of changes in systematic monetary policy
By looking only at the behavior of the parameters through time, it is di¢cult to grasp which of these are more important in explaining the observed behavior of the fed funds rate, and even more to explain other characteristics of the economic environment. For instance, it is not clear that the observed changes in the operating procedure are relevant to explain the observed behavior of the funds rate. Moreover, when comparing the Greenspan and Volcker conduct of monetary policy in terms of their response to in ‡ation, Á 0 t moves in a direction opposite to Á ¼ t . To determine which of the chairmen was responding more strongly to in ‡ation, we need to know which of the two parameters is more important and that depends on the level of ¼ e t . Two types of counterfactual analyses are considered. First I consider the e¤ect of a structural shocks under di¤erent policy scenarios. Note that since the impulse response function analysis focuses solely on the dynamics of the system, the e¤ect of the changes in Á 0 t are not taken into account. Second, using the estimated VAR and associated structural shocks, the series can be simulated under the alternative policy scenarios. This allows to summarize, in a meaningful way, the di¤erences in the scenarios, including Á 0 t , in terms of the outcome of variables such as GDP. In both cases, the policy scenarios considered are averages of the Á i t 's over four di¤erent periods: the pre-Volcker period (pre-V) that runs from the beginning of the sample to 1979:10, the …rst part of the Volcker period (V1) from 1979:10 to 1983, the second part of its tenure (V2) from 1983 to 1988:4 and the Greenspan (G) years.
Such changes in the parameters -and the question of which is more economically importantwould only be relevant if the choice of the policy rule actually mattered. Consequently, the results from this exercise can be interpreted as a measure of the e¤ect of the choice of systematic monetary policy, in the spirit of Sims and Zha (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) . As such, it is clearly subject to the Lucas (1976) critique. While this is a caveat of the counterfactual analysis, two arguments justify proceeding anyhow. First, even if the critique was empirically signi…cant, the exercise would still be informative by quantifying the importance of the changes with respect to the system. Second, as argued by Sims (1998) , the Lucas critique should be most relevant for large policy changes, especially if these changes imply values of the variables that are unprecedented in the sample. In the present case however, the TVP model estimated in the previous section explicitly embodied the fact that the time variation (variance of the parameters) was small and the policy scenarios considered are among those that have been observed historically.
Impulse Response Functions:
In the context of time varying parameters, the impulse response function analysis needs to be described more carefully. Here, I look at the e¤ect of a structural shock under di¤erent policy scenarios, assuming no further change in the parameters. Given the random walk speci…cation of the parameters, at any point in time, the policy rule is not expected to change. Consequently, the experiment represents the expected e¤ect of a shock conditional on the parameters having reached these values. All responses are to a one-standard deviation shock, except for ² sobtained from a VAR where the policy response function is left unrestricted. The "baseline" impulse response functions generally display the same behavior as the constrained versions, suggesting that the constraints imposed do not qualitatively a¤ect the dynamics of the system Figure 3 presents the impulse response functions for the di¤erent scenarios. Generally the responses are similar to those obtained by BM. The responses to an identi…ed shock to the expected in ‡ation (² ¼ t ) and to the expected unemployment gap (² u t ) equations are particularly important, as they provide a way of assessing the reasonableness of their relationships with the other variables of the VAR. This seems to be veri…ed. Following a sudden increase in expected in ‡ation, monetary policy tightens eventually and the same type of story emerges from the response to ² u t (which means that expected unemployment is below the NAIRU).
On the other hand, the estimated VAR seems to resurrect a mild price-puzzle 31 . In fact GDPD responds negatively to an expansionary monetary shock and the expectations of in ‡ation behave in a similar way. It is important to note that the VAR considered by BM, estimated over this particular sample, also displays the same pattern, thus suggesting that this result is driven by the sample, rather than Green Book forecast or the restrictions imposed on the policy reaction function.
Moreover, when the VAR is estimated over the 1978:1-1991:10 period, the puzzle disappears. It has been argued (Sims (1992) ) that the price puzzle could be an artefact of failing to account for some information available to the Fed. This makes the present result even more puzzling since the inclusion of the Green Book forecasts by itself should incorporate even more information.
The di¤erences in the impulse response functions points toward an appreciable e¤ect of Á ¼ t and Á u t . First it is interesting to notice that it usually takes from 6 months to a year for the impulse response functions to di¤er, which suggests moderate lags in the e¤ect of monetary policy.
While they display the same pattern of responses, their di¤erences resides in their magnitudes. In particular, the responses of all the variables to a monetary shock is larger under Greenspan than under any other scenarios. For instance, after 2 years, the response of GDP is 0.15% higher under the Greenspan than under the pre-Volcker policy rule, which is close to the peak response of the latter system. The response to a GDPD shock -which could be interpreted as a positive demand shock from the behavior of its implied responses -shows that GDP responds more and GDPD less under Greenspan, with the discrepancies in the response of the latter being quite small. 3 1 The price puzzle refers to an estimated decrease in price following a monetary expansion.
Counterfactual Simulations:
I now turn to the results of the counterfactual simulations. In particular, the hypothetical out- 
Discussion:
What explains the fact that the Greenspan's policy rule gives rise to a tighter monetary policy than Volcker for most of the 1978-1983 period and the opposite for the 1986:10-1991:10 period? One explanation could be related to the associated changes in the operating procedure. The results of 3 2 This is preferred to an alternative counterfactual analysis where the policy scenario is assumed to have been in e¤ect over the whole sample, because that would involve using the response of a shock over very long horizons, in which case they are loosely estimated. the counterfactual exercise allowing only these two to di¤er are presented in …gure 5. This clearly shows that the operating procedure does not play a crucial role as the path followed by GDP is very similar under all scenarios.
The explanation then has to lie with Á What explains the important increase in the interest rate of the early 80's and the subsequent recession? The results suggest that monetary policy explains a part of the magnitude observed in the variables, but these events could not have been avoided using any of the identi…ed con…guration of the policy rule. In particular, even if monetary policy had been conducted in the same way as in the 70's, the fed funds rate would have followed the same general path. It could still be the case that this period is explained by monetary policy shocks rather than changes in the response to the economy. This eventuality is studied in …gure 7, where the VAR is simulated setting the policy shocks to zero. The paths labeled V1 in the 1978-1983 period and G in the 1986:10-1991:10 period are rede…ned here so that their only di¤erence with the actual path comes from the absence of monetary shocks. Comparing these two realizations shows that the monetary policy shocks were particularly important for this period: the funds rate would have been lower by close to 3% in 1980:3 and GDP would have been 2% lower. Still, a recession would have happened anyhow, which then implies that its occurrence is explained by the other shocks of the model. As a result, if the monetary shocks is interpreted as resulting from a policy choice, the severity of the recession would be due in part to Volcker, but not its occurrence.
Sims (1998) reaches a similar conclusion when comparing the hypothetical outcomes arising from interchanging the interwar and postwar policy reaction functions in a counterfactual analysis.
As he argues, however, both …ndings do not necessarily imply that monetary policy is unrelated to the increase macroeconomic stability in the postwar period: beliefs about the central bank's ability and commitment to end crisis and stabilize the economy, while resulting in part from the conduct of monetary policy, are not captured by these simple rules.
Conclusion
The main conclusion from this investigation is that the U.S. conduct of monetary policy has changed in important ways. In terms of the response to the economic environment, there has been a manifest shift toward the in ‡ation concern, which was initiated during the Volcker period. Under Greenspan, the conduct of monetary policy evolved closer to a pure in ‡ation targeting rule. The counterfactual analysis con…rmed that these changes were economically important and suggested an important e¤ect of the choice of policy rule.
The occurrence of important changes during the Volcker period …ts anecdotal evidence. However, an interesting result of the counterfactual analysis is that the changes in the Fed's response to the economy do not seem to a¤ect the timing of the recessions. In particular, the high interest rate of the early 80's, and the recession that occurred in its aftermath, are not explained by the observed changes. Consequently, under the assumption that the present speci…cation of the policy reaction function properly characterizes the Fed's behavior, the observed changes, while a¤ecting the importance and the length of a recession, do not appear to be at the origin of the business cycles.
These results are obtained from what is hoped to be a realistic characterization of the policy reaction function and in a fairly non-structural framework. In these respects, however, two extensions would be worth pursuing. First, it is possible that the speci…cation of the policy reaction function fails to capture important features of the historical conduct of monetary policy which could be important to explain its e¤ect on real activity. For instance, I pointed out that beliefs about the commitment of the central bank to low in ‡ation, while part of the conduct of monetary policy, are no captured by the rule. Second, the question of the fundamental source of the changes still remains, and their implications on the structure of the other equations of the model has not been explicitly taken care of. An important extension of the present work would then be to cast these questions within a complete structural model of the economy. 
